Politics

22: International community should work with Burma's border resistance groups

Published on October 21, 2007
Re: "PM sends second letter to junta", Regional, October 20.

It is heartening to see that Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont is urging the Burmese military junta to speed up United Nations special envoy Ibrahim Gambari's visit to help facilitate the process towards democratisation and national reconciliation.

But Thailand, together with concerned international stakeholders, should consider an alternative plan if Gambari fails again like all the others who have tried on behalf of the United Nations.

Thailand, being a front-line state, could be instrumental for such a fallback plan. Let us think aloud, even if we risk venturing into uncharted waters.

The plan should be a two-pronged approach of "pressure and engagement", which seems to be the only viable approach to deal with such an entrenched military dictatorship.

In concrete terms, it would mean the UN endorsement of a rescue plan for the oppressed people of Burma to bring democratic change, provide security, reduce poverty, rebuild civil society and facilitate capacity-building. At the same time, appropriate pressures and sanctions coupled with benchmarks should be applied to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).

The International Crisis Group's report has pointed out that in addition to border areas in general, areas under the control of ceasefire armies' should be given preference for humanitarian aid, which needs, more or less, endorsement from the Burmese military regime. The best place to start would be along the Thai-Burma border, where the bulk of the population of one million internally-displace d persons population - over 600,000 people - are located and which is considered to be the militarised or contested zones between the SPDC regime and ethnic resistance forces.

This would need large-scale cooperation and coordination from the Thai government and could only be worked out once Thailand sees this undertaking as beneficial to all concerned in the long run. Consequently, this type of direct intervention could only be carried out in collaboration with the resistance forces, which control the strip along Thai-Burma border, such as the Shane State Army (South), the Karenni National Progressive Party and Karen National Union, together with UN endorsement. This would also mean territorial integrity and non-intervention norms would have to take a back seat, in favour of humanitarian intervention.

If this happened, a row of other humanitarian devices and forms of aid could be carried out across the border without having to deal with the SPDC. In other words, the international community could bypass the SPDC regime to help the badly needed oppressed population along the border. After this it is, of course, not too far-fetched to create "safe havens, sanctuaries of peace, peace corridors, health as a bridge for peace" initiatives and many others.

The point here is to assert the international community's authority in the contested zones, which the SPDC considers "grey areas" or hostile territories against its rule, and give back human security and dignity to the people of the border areas, whose human rights have been violated over and over again by the military regime.

If this were to happen, the SPDC's hold on power could be eroded faster than we ever expected. Just imagine what the UN Security Council endorsed sanctions coupled with such cross-border humanitarian relief operations could do to the entrenched military dictatorship.

In different forms, "humanitarian ceasefires" have been carried out in the midst of wars in several countries. Perhaps Burma could be added into this category, provided that the international community is genuinely committed to help the people of Burma out of this situation.

Khurtaikornkhaw
Bangkok

http://www.nationmu ltimedia. com/2007/ 10/21/pda/ opinion_30053214 .html

TOP